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I. Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
juveniles are less culpable than adults and therefore “less 
deserving of the most severe punishments.”1 For example, in 
                                                                                                     
 * Juris Doctor Candidate, Washington and Lee School of Law, 2018; 
Bachelor of Arts, Magna Cum Laude, Criminal Justice, Seton Hall University, 
2014. 
 1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 68 (2010) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. 
Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (“[W]e require [a sentencer] to take into account how 
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”). 
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Graham v. Florida,2 the Supreme Court ruled that sentencing a 
juvenile to life without parole (LWOP) for non-homicide offenses 
violates the Eighth Amendment.3 Additionally, in Miller v. 
Alabama,4 the Supreme Court found mandatory LWOP sentences 
for juveniles, in homicide cases, unconstitutional.5  
Unfortunately, the Graham and Miller decisions have caused 
much confusion about how to incorporate these rules into juvenile 
sentencing.6 In Graham, the Court found that juveniles who 
commit non-homicide offenses must be afforded a “meaningful 
opportunity for release” but allowed states to define meaningful 
opportunity, which has led to many different outcomes.7 Indeed, 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia 
predicted that failing to define “meaningful opportunity” would “no 
doubt embroil the courts for years.”8 For example, state courts have 
grappled with the issue of whether lengthy term-of-years 
sentences may violate Graham and Miller because they de facto 
sentence them to LWOP.9 Courts have also grappled with the 
question of whether the prospect for geriatric parole constitutes a 
meaningful opportunity for release.10  
                                                                                                     
 2. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that life 
imprisonment without parole for non-homicide crimes committed by juveniles 
violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 3. See id. at 74 (explaining that juveniles are not as culpable as adults and 
therefore should not be punished as severely). 
 4. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that life 
imprisonment without parole for homicide crimes committed by juveniles violates 
the Eighth Amendment). 
 5. See id. at 465 (explaining how juveniles should be afforded the 
opportunity to be rehabilitated and return to society). 
 6. See Kelly Scavone, How Long is Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses 
to De Facto Life Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. 
Alabama, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3439, 3441–42 (2015) (stating how the rules in 
Graham and Miller are unclear and giving an example of lengthy term of years 
sentences to show how difficult the application of those cases has been). 
 7. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75; see also Scavone, supra note 6, at 3442 
(“Responses in state courts to the issue of virtual LWOP sentences after Miller 
and Graham have varied significantly.”). 
 8.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 123. 
 9. See Scavone, supra note 6, at 3441–42 (explaining that lengthy term of 
years sentences are virtually LWOP sentences due to how young the offenders 
are). 
 10. See LeBlanc v. Mathena, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86090, at *31–32 (E.D. 
Va. July 1, 2015) (explaining how geriatric release was determined to be 
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This Note aims to assess whether geriatric parole should 
constitute a meaningful opportunity for release under Graham. 
The first section will discuss why juveniles are treated differently 
in the first place. Then, the rule set out in Graham will be further 
analyzed. Third, the issue of lengthy term-of-years sentences will 
be briefly discussed to exemplify issues the courts have had with 
the Graham rule. Then geriatric parole and parole will be defined 
and compared. Finally, this Note will analyze how courts have 
dealt with geriatric parole so far—with a heavy focus on Virginia 
courts. The Note will conclude with whether geriatric parole 
should constitute a meaningful opportunity for release. 
II. Why Juveniles Are Treated Differently 
Graham v. Florida, Roper v. Simmons11 and Miller v. Alabama 
have shaped the framework for treating juveniles differently in our 
criminal justice system. In Roper, the Court considered whether it 
is permissible under the Eighth Amendment to execute a juvenile 
for committing a capital offense.12 At age seventeen, Christopher 
Simmons discussed murdering someone with his two friends.13 
Simmons assured “[them] they could ‘get away with it’ because 
they were minors.”14 Simmons and one other friend proceeded to 
break into the victim’s—Mrs. Cook’s—house, and bind her arms 
and legs and wrap her face in duct tape.15 Simmons and his friend 
took Mrs. Cook to a railroad trestle and threw her over into the 
waters below, leaving her to drown.16 Simmons confessed to his 
crimes, and was convicted and sentenced to death.17 Even with 
                                                                                                     
compliant with Graham but ultimately disagreed with the Virginia Supreme 
Court); but see State v. Zuber, 126 A.3d 335, 346–47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2015) (stating that a defendant’s opportunity for geriatric release would satisfy 
Graham and Miller). 
 11. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that capital 
punishment for crimes committed by juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 12. See id. at 555–56 (discussing juveniles’ culpability for the crimes they 
committed). 
 13. Id. at 556. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 556–57. 
 17. Id. at 557. 
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these egregious facts, the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed the decision, holding that capital punishment of a 
juvenile is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment due to 
the mitigating factor of youth.18 
Miller v. Alabama involved two juveniles, both age fourteen, 
who committed separate crimes but were both sentenced to 
mandatory terms of LWOP for homicide offenses.19 Kuntrell 
Jackson and two other boys robbed a video store in Arkansas.20 
Initially, Jackson stayed outside as the robbery was taking place 
but later entered the store to see what was happening.21 It was not 
clear whether Jackson then stated, “[w]e ain’t playin,’” or instead 
told his friends, “I thought you all was playin.’”22 Nevertheless, one 
of the other boys shot and killed the clerk.23 Jackson was charged 
with capital murder and aggravated robbery.24  
Evan Miller was sentenced to LWOP for a homicide offense.25 
Miller and a friend attempted to steal his neighbor’s—Mr. 
Cannon’s—wallet after smoking marijuana with him.26 Cannon 
was passed out at the time, but he woke up and grabbed Miller’s 
throat.27 Miller’s friend struck Cannon with a nearby baseball bat 
and Cannon then released Miller.28 After that, Miller took the bat 
and repeatedly struck Cannon.29 He then placed a sheet over 
Cannon’s head and stated, “I am God, I’ve come to take your life,” 
and delivered one final blow.30 Later, the boys returned to the 
trailer to burn it to get rid of the evidence.31 Cannon died from 
                                                                                                     
 18. See id. at 575 (holding capital punishment cannot be imposed upon 
juveniles). 
 19. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 466. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 467. 
 26. Id. at 468. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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smoke inhalation.32 The Supreme Court remanded the case, 
reversing the lower courts’ sentences of LWOP because it found 
youth too compelling a factor to allow a mandatory sentence of 
LWOP.33  
The Supreme Court has stated three reasons why juveniles 
should be treated differently than adults in criminal justice 
cases.34 First, juveniles lack maturity and have an underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility when compared to adults.35 This often 
results in reckless decision-making.36 Second, “juveniles are more 
vulnerable or susceptible [than adults] to negative influences and 
outside pressures, including peer pressure.”37 Finally, “the 
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. 
The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less 
fixed.”38 Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined that 
juveniles are less culpable for their crimes than adults and may 
not be a danger to society forever.39 As a result, a mandatory 
sentence of LWOP for a juvenile who committed homicide is 
unconstitutional.40 Additionally, a juvenile cannot be sentenced to 
LWOP for a non-homicide offense.41 
                                                                                                     
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 465. 
 34. See cases cited supra note 1 (delineating the major reasons to take into 
consideration when sentencing a juvenile). 
 35. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (explaining how it is rare when 
“a juvenile offender has sufficient psychological maturity, and at the same time 
demonstrates sufficient depravity, to merit a sentence of death”).  
 36. See id. at 569 (discussing why a juvenile may commit such a heinous 
crime). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 570. 
 39. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2012) (explaining 
incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth and thus it cannot be assumed a juvenile 
is forever dangerous). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (“This clear line is 
necessary to prevent the possibility that [LWOP] sentences will be imposed on 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are sufficiently culpable to merit that 
punishment.”). 
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III. Graham’s Meaningful Opportunity for Release 
Terrance Graham pled guilty to armed burglary with assault 
or battery and attempted armed robbery when he was sixteen 
years old.42 He was later released on parole.43 Terrence violated his 
parole when he was involved in a violent home robbery and fled 
from the police.44 Consequently, the trial court sentenced Terrance 
to life without parole for armed burglary.45 The Supreme Court 
reversed the decision, finding it unconstitutional.46 
After reviewing the mitigating youth factors, the Supreme 
Court held that a juvenile who commits a non-homicide offense 
must have some meaningful opportunity for release based on 
maturity and demonstrated rehabilitation.47 The Court also 
specified that a “[s]tate is not required to guarantee eventual 
freedom to such an offender.”48  
The Graham Court did state some examples of what will not 
qualify as a meaningful opportunity.49 For example, any “criminal 
procedure laws that fail to take defendant’s youthfulness into 
account at all would be flawed.”50 Furthermore, if there is nothing 
in the state’s law that “prevents its courts from sentencing a 
juvenile nonhomicide offender to life without parole” it is 
inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment.51 The Court did not 
explain definitively what would constitute a meaningful 
opportunity.52  
                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 53–54. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 55. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 81–82 (explaining that due to the juvenile’s culpability he may 
be able to be rehabilitated and return to society). 
 47. Id. at 50; see also LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12cv340, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 86090, at *29–30 (E.D. Va. July 1, 2015) (citing Angel v. Commonwealth, 
704 S.E.2d 386, 401 (Va. 2011)) (“The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that an 
inmate’s opportunity to apply for geriatric release renders a sentence of life 
without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders compliant with Graham.”). 
 48. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010). 
 49. See id. at 76 (discussing certain situations that will not suffice to meet a 
meaningful opportunity). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 75 (deciding state courts may define what constitutes a 
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Two years after Graham was decided, in Miller v. Alabama, 
the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify what meaningful 
opportunity means.53 In Miller, as noted above, the Court extended 
the youth factors to juvenile offenders who committed homicide 
and invalidated laws that mandated LWOP.54 Unfortunately, the 
Court did not clarify what meaningful opportunity means and 
continued to allow states to decide the matter.55 In fact, the 
Supreme Court merely mentioned meaningful opportunity for 
release in one line of the opinion to help support its decision.56 
Many states have responded differently to Graham.57 The 
large disparity among the states indicates how broad and 
confusing the definition of meaningful opportunity is.58 For 
example, Michigan provides for release after a minimum of ten 
years served, Colorado requires a minimum of forty years served 
and Virginia has used geriatric parole to satisfy a meaningful 
opportunity.59 Other states, such as California, have statutes that 
permit any inmate, sentenced to LWOP, to seek resentencing after 
                                                                                                     
meaningful opportunity for release). 
 53. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (holding that “the Eighth 
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without 
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”). 
 54. See id. at 473 (considering youth “in determining the appropriateness of 
a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole”). 
 55. See id. at 479 (holding that meaningful opportunity precludes a life in 
prison but providing little guidance beyond that). 
 56. See id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010)) (referencing the 
meaningful opportunity language from Graham, but ultimately using factors of 
youth to make the ultimate decision). 
 57. See, e.g., H.B. 5512, 94th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Mich. 2006) (detailing 
Michigan’s law for dealing with the Graham decision); see also, e.g., H.B. 06-1315, 
65th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (stating Colorado’s law for dealing with 
Graham). 
 58. See Rebecca Lowry, The Constitutionality of Lengthy Term-Of-Years 
Sentences for Juvenile Non-Homicide Offenders, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 881, 912–
13 (2014) (giving examples of the variety of different outcomes on how to deal with 
Graham). 
 59. See H.B. 5512 (detailing the disparity in application of the Graham rule); 
H.B. 06-1315. 
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serving a minimum of fifteen years.60 Many other states have 
responded as well but few are exactly alike.61  
Legislatures are not the only ones Graham has left puzzled. 
State courts have also had difficulties deciding how to interpret a 
meaningful opportunity.62 One common point of contention 
between courts is whether Graham requires juveniles to have the 
opportunity for a “‘meaningful life outside of prison’ in which to 
‘engage meaningfully’ in a career or raising a family,”63 or if it 
merely requires a “meaningful and realistic ‘opportunity to obtain 
release.’”64 On the one hand, Graham would demand a much 
stricter analysis of sentencing if life after prison is what must be 
meaningful.65 On the other hand, some interpret Graham as 
merely requiring a meaningful chance of release regardless of what 
life may be like after prison.66 Under a literal translation, it would 
appear the latter is correct because the Court merely states that 
there must be a meaningful opportunity for release.67 But some 
                                                                                                     
 60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(2)(A)(1) (2015) (“[D]efendant was sentenced to 
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for 
at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for 
recall and resentencing.”). 
 61. A State-by-State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, THE ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (July 31, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/amp/US/wireStory/state-state-
juvenile-life-parole-48942316 (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 62. See State v. Zuber, 126 A.3d 335, 346–47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) 
(indicating courts that have struggled with defining meaningful opportunity and 
what it needs to entail). 
 63. Id. at 347 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75, 79 (2010)); see also 
Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1047–48 (Conn. 2015) (stating 
Graham requires a meaningful opportunity for life outside of prison). 
 64. Id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)); see also 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016) (explaining meaningful 
does not involve quality of life outside of prison but rather that they are afforded 
some opportunity of life outside of prison). 
 65. See id. (citing cases that show courts struggling to decide what an 
opportunity for a reasonable life outside of prison would constitute). 
 66. See id. (describing when courts have struggled to decide whether there 
was a meaningful opportunity for release even if that opportunity came at a time 
in the prisoner’s life that he would not lead a meaningful life outside of prison). 
 67. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (concluding Graham had 
to be afforded some opportunity for release but stating nothing about what his 
life must entail after release or when such opportunity may be granted, thereby 
indicating that the juvenile merely needs to be given an actual chance for release). 
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courts have resolved this issue by examining what the Graham 
Court was trying to achieve in its decision.68  
This contention has also led to further debate on whether life 
expectancy should be involved in sentencing a juvenile offender—
discussed in more detail below.69 Some courts have used the 
National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSR) to determine life 
expectancies.70 Although neither side has prevailed on what a 
meaningful opportunity means, both will be useful in assessing 
whether geriatric release could survive Graham.71 
IV. Other Forms of Release–Lengthy Term of Years Sentences  
It is imperative to understand the issue of lengthy 
term-of-years sentences (lengthy sentences).72 Many of the issues 
discussed in lengthy term-of-years cases also appear in geriatric 
release cases and many more courts have dealt with the former.73  
A lengthy sentence is precisely what it sounds like: a long 
sentence that can involve aggregate or concurrent sentencing.74 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Casiano, 115 A.3d at 1047–48 (stating the Supreme Court wanted 
the juvenile to a have meaningful opportunity to reenter society or life outside of 
prison); see also People v. Perez, 214 Cal. App. 4th 49, 57–58 (2013) (delineating 
that there needs to be some “meaningful life expectancy” left after the opportunity 
for release). 
 69. See State v. Zuber, 126 A.3d 335, 344–45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) 
(discussing the relevance of life expectancy when sentencing a juvenile). 
 70. See id. (explaining how detailed the NVSR is in determining life 
expectancies). 
 71. See id. at 346–47 (arguing the only opportunity required is the 
opportunity to obtain release); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 
737 (2016) (agreeing with Zuber’s reasoning); Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 
A.3d 1031, 1046–48 (Conn. 2015) (arguing Graham requires a meaningful 
opportunity of a life outside of prison); People v. Perez, 214 Cal. App. 4th 49, 57–
58 (2013) (expressing similar reasoning to Casiano). 
 72. See LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12cv340, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86090, 
at *44–45 (E.D. Va. July 1, 2015) (discussing that the age an offender must attain 
to be considered for geriatric release is problematic when determining whether 
this would constitute a meaningful opportunity for release). 
 73. See, e.g., id. (dealing with a defendant’s lengthy term of years sentence). 
 74. See, e.g., Zuber, 126 A.3d at 343 (assuming, without deciding, that 
Graham could be extended “to a situation where a defendant commits a number 
of offenses . . . and receives a number of term-of-year sentences that are imposed 
consecutively and result in an aggregate sentence equaling or exceeding the 
[defendant’s] life expectancy . . . .”). 
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Some states have ruled such a sentence is unconstitutional but 
others have not.75 For example, California and Iowa have ruled 
against lengthy sentences because they believe the sentences are 
de facto LWOP sentences.76 These two states found that shortening 
a life in prison sentence to a long number of years was 
unconstitutional because youth was not taken into consideration 
and their punishments were essentially LWOP.77 
Alternatively, states such as Florida and Louisiana are not 
convinced that lengthy sentences violate Graham.78 Florida and 
Louisiana’s courts reason that creating a bright line rule in this 
situation is a question better suited for the legislature.79 Louisiana 
defended these decisions—without guidance from the Supreme 
Court or legislature—because it was not the court’s place to 
overrule lengthy sentences, even when numerous convictions 
added up to more than the juvenile’s life expectancy.80 
Again, one contentious issue that courts are split on is whether 
“meaningful” should involve life outside of prison or just 
opportunity for release. This consequently triggers the debate over 
whether life expectancy should be a part the equation.81 Some 
                                                                                                     
 75. See Scavone, supra note 6, at 3457 (detailing different outcomes from 
different courts trying to resolve the issue of lengthy sentences). 
 76. See id. (“Both states recognize that lengthy term-of-years sentences 
produce the same results as LWOP and warrant the same concerns as those seen 
in Miller.”). 
 77. See id. at 3460 (“In this regard, the Iowa governor simply substituted one 
sentence for another in order to avoid constitutional issues. No aspects of youth 
or any other factors were taken into account in the governor’s decision to commute 
the thirty-eight LWOP sentences.”). 
 78. See id. at 3463–67 (outlining cases that have been upheld in Florida with 
sentences of 110 and sixty years for example). 
 79. See id. (“The court noted that the exact point at which a lengthy term-of-
years sentence becomes the equivalent of LWOP cannot be determined without 
drawing some sort of seemingly arbitrary line based on discretionary judgment 
calls.”).  
 80. See id. (focusing on Graham’s limited holding, the court decided in State 
v. Brown, 118 So. 3d 332 (La. 2013) that a forty-year sentence without any 
possibility of parole was constitutional). 
 81. See State v. Zuber, 126 A.3d 335, 347–48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) 
(discussing life expectancy); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 737 
(2016) (saying that if a juvenile’s crime does not reflect irrevocable corruption, 
their “hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored”); Casiano 
v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1047 (Conn. 2015) (arguing what meaningful 
opportunity actually means). 
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argue that any sentence exceeding a juvenile’s life expectancy is de 
facto LWOP and therefore unconstitutional.82 Yet others argue 
Graham only restricts LWOP sentences, not sentences that are 
merely lengthy.83 They argue that life expectancy is not an issue in 
such circumstances.84 The main concern is that the facts in 
Graham did not involve multiple felonies that could call for 
consecutive sentences that aggregate to lengthy sentences.85 So, a 
case dealing with aggregate sentences—that could add up to a 
term that exceeds the juvenile’s life expectancy—is distinguishable 
from Graham.86 This issue is also split in court decisions around 
the country.87  
The above dispute is further complicated because even if a 
lengthy sentence is unconstitutional it is not certain when the 
opportunity for release must be, regarding the juvenile’s life 
expectancy.88 One year? Ten years? Unfortunately, these questions 
have gone unanswered.89  
                                                                                                     
 82. See Lowry, supra note 58, at 898 (noting the Supreme Court of California 
concluded that a sentence exceeding a juvenile’s life expectancy was 
unconstitutional because it did not give any opportunity for release even though 
it was not technically a life sentence). 
 83. See id. at 902 (referencing an Arizona opinion which upheld a 139-year 
sentence because none of his individual sentences would have resulted in a life-
without-parole-sentence). 
 84. See id. (discussing an Arizona court that upheld a long sentence that 
exceeded the juvenile’s life expectancy because Graham did not prohibit long 
sentences and the juvenile at hand was being sentenced for consecutive years due 
to his thirty-seven felony convictions). 
 85. Zuber, 126 A.3d at 343 (assuming, without deciding, that Graham could 
be extended “to a situation where a defendant commits a number of 
offenses . . . and receives a number of term-of-year sentences that are imposed 
consecutively and result in an aggregate sentence equaling or exceeding the 
[defendant’s] life expectancy . . . ”). 
 86. See id. (describing the circuit split over whether Graham applies to 
aggregate sentences). 
 87. See id. (citing cases that do and do not agree with aggregate lengthy 
sentences being an issue under Graham).  
 88. See cases cited supra note 81 (citing cases that argue whether there 
needs to be essentially no time at all before his life expectancy after the juvenile 
is afforded an opportunity to be released versus the juvenile being required to 
have an opportunity for release with significant time left before his life 
expectancy). 
 89. See id. (citing cases that argue over whether there needs to be essentially 
no time at all before his life expectancy after the juvenile is afforded an 
opportunity to be released versus the juvenile being required to have an 
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Nevertheless, Graham, Roper, and Miller all attempt to make 
sure that the youthful factors of a juvenile are considered when 
sentencing.90 Therefore, sentencing a juvenile near his or her life 
expectancy negates the juvenile’s youthful factors because a 
significant portion of his or her life will be spent in prison with no 
real hope for release.91  
This is not to say that a prison can only assess a juvenile before 
his life expectancy.92 Rather, the opportunity for release is 
meaningful only if the offender is given the chance to demonstrate 
rehabilitation earlier in his sentence.93 If the prison decides the 
juvenile is not ready to reenter society, then the prison may deny 
his release.94 This is imperative to keep in mind because many 
aspects of geriatric parole depend upon age, health, and triggering 
events to obtain release.95 This can be compared to the above 
analysis to determine whether geriatric parole affords a 
meaningful opportunity for release.96 
V. Geriatric Release and Parole 
This section will define and explain how most geriatric release 
and parole statutes work. It will then compare the two programs 
and highlight key differences. This will help further the analysis 
                                                                                                     
opportunity for release with significant time left before his life expectancy). 
 90. See cases cited supra note 1 (citing cases that wanted youth to be 
assessed because juveniles are different than adults and as they mature they may 
no longer be threats to society). 
 91. See Mark T. Freeman, Note, Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. 
Florida and the Reality of De Facto LWOP Sentences, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 961, 
978 (2014) (explaining that lengthy sentences do not afford the juvenile any 
chance at rehabilitation). 
 92. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010) (explaining a state has the 
power to determine whether and when a perpetrator is ready to be released). 
 93. See id. at 73 (“It is for legislatures to determine what rehabilitative 
techniques are appropriate and effective.”). 
 94. See id. at 75 (explaining a state has the power to determine whether and 
when a perpetrator is ready to be released). 
 95. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2017). 
 96. See FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, NEW COMPASSIONATE 
RELEASE RULES: BREAKING IT DOWN 1 (2013), http://famm.org/wp-content/up 
loads/2013/07/FAMM-explains-new-compassionate-release-rules-FINAL.pdf 
(discussing basic requirements to be considered for geriatric release) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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of whether geriatric parole should be considered a meaningful 
opportunity for release. It will become clear that the main 
differences to focus on are the age minimums and health 
requirements included in geriatric release programs that do not 
exist in parole programs.97  
A. Geriatric Release Defined 
Examples of geriatric release statutes may be the clearest way 
to define the term. One example is the federal statute for geriatric 
parole, which is codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.98 
Part (a) of 28 C.F.R. § 2.78 has limiting factors that are required 
before an inmate is eligible for geriatric release.99 One such factor 
is that the prisoner must be at least sixty-five years old with health 
issues related to aging.100 Another important part to this section is 
that a commission determines the eligibility for release.101 Third, 
such release does not require the inmate to complete his or her 
minimum sentence.102  
Part (b) includes further limiting factors for geriatric 
release.103 The Commission may approve geriatric parole if it finds 
there is low risk that the prisoner will commit a new crime, and 
the “prisoner’s release would not be incompatible with the welfare 
of society.”104 Furthermore, part (c) states that, when determining 
whether release should be granted, the Commission must consider 
                                                                                                     
 97. Compare Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-40.01 (2001), with Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-
151 (1993). 
 98. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.78 (2003) (defining geriatric parole on the federal level). 
 99. See id. (“Upon receipt of a report from the institution in which the 
prisoner is confined that a prisoner who is at least 65 years of age has a chronic 
infirmity, illness, or disease related to aging, the Commission shall determine 
whether or not to release the prisoner on geriatric parole.”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. § 2.78(a) (“Release on geriatric parole may be ordered by the 
Commission at any time, whether or not the prisoner has completed his or her 
minimum sentence.”). 
 103. See id. § 2.78(b) (laying out additional factors for granting geriatric 
parole). 
 104. Id. 
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the offender’s age at the time the crime was committed as well as 
the seriousness of the crime.105  
The remaining subsections of the regulation address specific 
details related to the Commission’s determination of geriatric 
release.106 Part (d) allows a prisoner’s representative to apply for 
geriatric parole,107 while part (e) lists additional factors that the 
Commission must consider when determining geriatric parole 
eligibility.108 These factors, among others, include criminal history 
and the severity of his or her illness.109 Part (f) allows the prisoner 
to appeal the Commission’s decision.110 Finally, part (g) states that 
prisoners are not eligible for geriatric parole if they were convicted 
of first degree murder, were armed during the crime’s commission, 
or had the physical or medical condition(s) present at the time of 
their sentencing hearing.111 
Virginia’s courts have recently dealt with the issue of whether 
geriatric parole is a meaningful opportunity for release.112 The 
Virginia statute for geriatric parole states: 
Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a conviction for a felony 
offense, other than a Class 1 felony, (i) who has reached the age of 
sixty-five or older and who has served at least five years of the sentence 
imposed or (ii) who has reached the age of sixty or older and who has 
served at least ten years of the sentence imposed may petition the 
Parole Board for conditional release. The Parole Board shall 
                                                                                                     
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. §2.78(d)–(g). 
 107. Id. § 2.78(d). 
 108. Id. § 2.78(e). 
 109. See id. (identifying seven distinct factors—including the history and 
severity of the prisoner’s illness—for determining whether to grant geriatric 
parole).  
 110. See id. § 2.78(f) (“A prisoner, the prisoner’s representative, or the 
institution, may request the Commission to reconsider its decision on the basis of 
changed circumstances.”). 
 111. Id. § 2.78(g)(2). 
 112. See LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12cv340, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86090, 
at *38–40 (E.D. Va. July 1, 2015) (discussing the issue of whether geriatric parole 
could substitute for standard parole as a meaningful opportunity for release); see 
also Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 402 (Va. 2011) (agreeing with the 
Commonwealth that Virginia’s geriatric release statute provides juvenile 
offenders who had not committed homicide with a meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release). 
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promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this 
section.113 
Although this state statute reads much simpler than its C.F.R. 
counterpart, it differs in several important respects.  
First, the Virginia code excludes Class One felons from 
geriatric release eligibility.114 But Class One felonies may only 
attach to perpetrators over eighteen years of age and, therefore, do 
not apply to this discussion.115 Second, the Virginia code 
distinguishes between ages sixty-five and sixty, and further 
requires prisoners to serve a specified amount of their sentence 
before becoming eligible for release.116 Third, the Virginia statue 
does not require the Commission to consider certain factors related 
to the prisoner.117 
Conversely, the federal code does not consider geriatric release 
for anyone under the age of sixty-five, and does not further impose 
any time-served requirement for eligible ages.118 And yet, despite 
these differences, several key similarities exist between the state 
code and the relevant C.F.R. provisions. General age requirements 
largely determine eligibility in both frameworks.119 Secondly, in 
either framework, satisfying the age requirement alone does not 
guarantee eligibility.120  
                                                                                                     
 113. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 114. See id. § 53.1-40.01 (“Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a 
conviction for a felony offense, other than a Class 1 felony . . . may petition the 
Parole Board for conditional release.”). 
 115. See id. § 18.2-10 (defining class one felonies). 
 116. See id. § 53.1-40.01 (stating that prisoners age sixty-five or older must 
serve five years of their sentence as compared prisoners aged sixty or older, who 
must serve ten years of their sentence). 
 117. Id. 
 118. 28 C.F.R.§ 2.78 (2003). 
 119. Compare id. § 2.78 (mandating the individual to be at least sixty-five 
years old and have a chronic illness), with VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2001) 
(requiring candidates to be at least sixty-five years old and have served five years 
or be sixty-years old and served ten years of sentence). 
 120. Compare id. § 2.78 (“[T]he Commission shall determine whether or not 
to release the prisoner on geriatric parole. Release on geriatric parole may be 
ordered by the Commission at any time, whether or not the prisoner has 
completed his or her minimum sentence.”), with VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 
(2001) (stating that a Commission will determine eligibility separate from 
whether the prisoner satisfies the age requirement). 
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The Bureau of Prisons also created guidelines that detail three 
categories of prisoners that may be eligible for geriatric release.121 
The first category identifies eligibility on the basis of medical 
reasons, such as terminal or debilitating illnesses.122 The second 
category establishes eligibility on the basis of age.123 This category 
further distinguishes seniors with medical conditions from those 
without.124 The latter requires that prisoners, who are at least 
seventy years old, serve thirty years of his or her sentence.125  
Further, eligible prisoners without medical conditions also 
include those sixty-five years or older who serve ten years or 
75 percent of their sentence.126 Alternatively, eligible prisoners 
with medical conditions include those sixty-five or older who serve 
50 percent or more of their sentence and suffer from chronic or 
serious condition.127 Such conditions may be due to age, 
deteriorating mental or physical health substantially diminishing 
the ability to function in prison, or generally those conditions 
which treatment will not improve.128 The final group of categories 
includes non-medical necessity—like taking care of a child or 
spouse.129 Again, although some differences exist between these 
rules and the preceding statutes, age and health remain key 
factors for determining a person’s eligibility for geriatric release.130 
                                                                                                     
 121. See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, supra note 96, at 1 
(describing new rules for compassionate release and reduction in sentencing 
programs). 
 122. See id. at 1–2 (including within the first category of eligibility prisoners 
that have a “terminal medical condition” or a “debilitated medical condition”). 
 123. See id. at 2 (listing the second category of eligibility as “elderly”). 
 124. See id. (dividing the second category of eligibility between “elderly non-
medical” and “elderly medical”).  
 125. See id. (describing the eligibility requirements for elderly prisoners 
without medical conditions). 
 126. Id.  
 127. See id. (setting eligibility requirements for elderly prisoners with medical 
conditions). 
 128. See id. (explaining qualifying medical conditions). 
 129. See id. at 2–4 (describing eligibility categories on the basis of non-medical 
necessity). 
 130. Compare FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, supra note 96, at 2 
(considering only candidates who satisfy the elderly medical or elderly no-medical 
requirements), with VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2001) (requiring the candidate 
to be over sixty-five and served five years or over sixty and served ten years to be 
considered), and 28 C.F.R. § 2.78 (2003) (basing geriatric parole on the 
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As of May 2015, only a few states— Illinois, Massachusetts, 
South Carolina, and Utah—do not have laws regarding geriatric 
release in their prisons.131 Comparatively, forty-six states, the 
federal government, and Washington D.C. all have 
geriatric-release laws.132 Many of these states differ on the 
appropriate procedures and regulations for geriatric parole: 
Only 18 of the states seem to have very specific, strictly 
defined . . . regulations to follow for parole decisions. The more 
specific rules include the mechanism, such as who makes the 
final determination. In addition, 11 states have very clearly 
written rules governing physician documentation . . . and what 
factors must be included in their medical letter.  
Though all applications are subject to official parole board 
review, the series of steps in order to reach the parole board and 
the supporting documentation varies. [M]ost provide for a 
deputy warden in conjunction with the prison medical director 
reviewing all documentation prior [to] making a submission to 
the parole board. Often, the prisoner or his advocate . . . will 
petition directly [to the board]. The medical director can also 
petition for early release if the prisoner cannot. The 29 states 
that have fewer procedures . . . that provide that parole review 
boards consider all information prior to rendering a final 
decision. At least 3 states have requirements that the parole 
board must review the request for early parole within a certain 
number of days (e.g., 30 days), while most assume the case will 
be heard in a timely manner or be reviewed by the next meeting 
of the parole board.133 
Importantly, with slight variations, each state’s law centers 
around age and health.134  
                                                                                                     
individuals age and whether they are ill). 
 131. See Tina Maschi et al., Analysis of United States Compassionate and 
Geriatric Release Laws: Towards a Rights-Based Response for Diverse Elders and 
Their Families and Communities, BE THE EVIDENCE INT’L 9 (2015), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/Analysis%20of%20United%
20States%20Compassionate%20and%20Geriatric%20Release%20Laws,%20Be%
20the%20Evidence%20Press,%202015.pdf (analyzing the laws and regulations 
related to early releases of prisoners on the basis of advanced age or illness) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 132. See id. (identifying all the jurisdictions that have geriatric release laws). 
 133. Id. at 14. 
 134. Id. at 3. 
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Geriatric release programs have many benefits.135 Lowered 
costs and freed-up budgets represent one major justification for 
releasing people.136 For example, “[i]t costs around $24,000 a year 
to house a young prisoner, but the expenses for an aging prisoner 
can be up to $72,000 per year.”137 This difference largely results 
from differing medical costs.138 Furthermore, “[i]nmates are not 
eligible for federal health insurance programs such as Medicaid 
and Medicare, but by law are required to receive medical 
treatment . . . prisons cover all the costs . . . [regardless of] whose 
responsibility it is to maintain prisons, taxpayers are the ones who 
pay for it.”139 Thus, considering these costs and the low threat that 
older prisoners with health problems pose to society, many feel the 
eligibility for early release is justified.140  
B. Parole Defined 
Parole is essentially a prisoner’s release from prison prior to 
serving his or her entire sentence.141 Having met certain 
conditions, paroled prisoners serve the remainder of their sentence 
outside of prison “under strict supervision.”142 Although these 
conditions may differ for every person, parole commonly includes:  
                                                                                                     
 135. See Valeriya Metla, Aging Inmates: A Prison Crisis, L. STREET (Feb. 15, 
2015), https://law streetmedia.com/issues/law-and-politics/aging-inmates-prison-
crisis/ (detailing the expenses of housing criminals) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Maschi et al., supra note 
131, at 6 (stating the cost on a nationwide level that elderly prisoners cost nearly 
$2.1 billion annually as of 2012, about three times the cost of younger prisoners). 
 136. See id. (identifying one rational for early release of prisoners). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. (correlating increased expenses for aging prisoner populations 
with increased prevalence of health issues). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. (identifying another rational for early release of prisoners). 
 141. See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE [hereinafter DOJ 
FAQ], https://www. justice.gov/uspc/frequently-asked-questions#q2 (last updated 
Sept. 29, 2015) (“When someone is paroled, they serve part of their sentence under 
the supervision of their community.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 142. FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LACK OF PAROLE FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1 (Nov. 29, 2012), 
[hereinafter LACK OF PAROLE FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS] http://famm.org/ 
Repository/Files/FAQ%20Federal%20Parole%2011%2029%2012.pdf (describing 
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An agreement not to leave the state/district; [f]requent 
meetings with a parole officer; [a]n agreement not to be out past 
a certain hour (also called curfew); [a]n agreement not to use or 
possess drugs, alcohol, firearms, etc.; [k]eeping a steady job; 
[a]ttending drug or alcohol addiction treatment programs; 
[s]ubmitting to frequent or random drug tests; [and] [n]ot 
associating with people with criminal records.143 
Comparatively, the United States Department of Justice describes 
parole as placing someone “under the supervision of their 
community . . . if (a) the inmate has substantially observed the 
rules of the institution; (b) release would not depreciate the 
seriousness of the offense or promote disrespect for the law; and 
(c) release would not jeopardize the public welfare.”144 
Nevertheless, not all systems allow for parole.145 Typically, 
those systems that do not have parole use a similar system called 
“good time credits,” which likewise allows for early release based 
on good behavior.146 To elaborate, the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 (SRA) eliminated federal parole for all prisoners convicted on 
or after November 1, 1987.147 Nevertheless, the SRA did not 
eliminate parole eligibility for prisoners sentenced before that 
date.148 The United States Parole Commission therefore retains 
some authority to grant early release.149  
The Commission performs parole hearings for a small number 
of people who fall into one of the following categories: those 
convicted before November 1, 1987; military code offenders in 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) institutions; violators of D.C. law 
sentenced before August 5, 2000; criminals prosecuted in other 
                                                                                                     
the process of parole) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). 
 143. Id. 
 144. DOJ FAQ, supra note 141.  
 145. See LACK OF PAROLE FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS, supra note 142, at 1 (“The 
alternative is a system in which the sentence cannot be reduced by parole. A 
sentence must be served in its entirety (though often with reductions for good 
behavior, set by statute).”). 
 146. See id. (describing what happens in “truth in sentencing” systems). 
 147. See id. at 2 (stating that although a statutory federal parole system 
technically does not exist, a parole board may nonetheless issue parole for 
prisoners sentenced before November 1, 1987). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. (detailing the authority and responsibilities of the United States 
Parole Commission). 
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countries, but transferred to the U.S for punishment; and State 
defendants in the U.S. Marshals Service Witness Protection 
Program.150  
Congress abolished the federal parole system partly because 
of its goal to punish criminal offenders as opposed to rehabilitating 
them.151 Furthermore, Congress, like many others, believed that 
prison could not effectively rehabilitate people.152 Congress also 
decided to abolish parole because it caused uncertain and 
inconsistent prison terms.153 For example, while two criminals look 
identical on paper—having committed the same crime, and 
possessing the same criminal record and corresponding sentence—
one may serve far less time than the other due to inconsistent 
guidelines and rules for parole boards.154 Finally, Congress was 
concerned about public fear of releasing a criminal too early who 
would then commit another crime.155 
Many states’ systems for parole eligibility differ.156 
Nonetheless, most states’ parole board will review the prisoner’s 
record and interview him.157 Some common questions parole 
boards ask when deciding parole eligibility include: whether they 
have a stable home to return to, whether the prisoner can 
immediately support himself with income, the likelihood of 
recidivism, the seriousness of the offense, whether the prisoner 
followed prison rules while incarcerated, and if the victims have 
any strong concerns regarding the prisoner’s parole.158 
                                                                                                     
 150. See id. (listing categories of people eligible for parole on the federal level). 
 151. See id. (identifying Congress’ goals for the criminal justice system). 
 152. See id. (“The SRA rejected rehabilitation as the primary goal of our 
sentencing system. Instead, it stated that the purpose of imprisonment is 
punishment.”). 
 153. See id. (“The public and Congress frowned upon these kinds of 
inconsistencies and uncertainties.”). 
 154. See id. (identifying differences resulting from varying parole board 
guidelines). 
 155. See id. at 3 (“In the late 1970s, when lawmakers wanted to eliminate 
federal parole, many polls showed that the public favored longer sentences for 
prisoners. The public also believed that parole was “setting people free” who were 
still a danger to society.”). 
 156. See id. at 4 (“Every state’s process for deciding when a person will be 
considered for parole is different.”). 
 157. See id. (“Typically, the board interviews the prisoner or reviews his 
record.”). 
 158. Id.; see Janet Portman, The Parole Process: An Early Release from Prison, 
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Additionally, some states issue tests to those who are applying for 
parole, such as psychological exams.159 Notably, most states give 
full power to the parole board to decide if the prisoner is ready for 
release; their decision typically cannot be appealed or challenged 
in any court.160  
Virginia’s parole system is a good example of what such a 
system with a fully empowered parole board looks like. Virginia’s 
parole system categorizes parole eligibility according to how many 
prior offenses the prisoner has.161 For example, first-time offenders 
may be eligible for parole after serving one-fourth of the sentence, 
or after serving twelve years of the sentence, if one-fourth of the 
sentence is more than twelve years.162 Second-time offenders are 
eligible for parole after serving one-third of the sentence, or after 
serving thirteen years of the sentence if one-third of the sentence 
is more than thirteen years.163 The time increments then increase 
to one-half and fourteen years for third time offenders and then 
three-fourths and fifteen years for fourth time offenders.164 The 
                                                                                                     
http://criminal.lawyers.com/parole-probation/parole-an-early-release-fro m-
prison.html (last visited April 17, 2018) (explaining additional common concerns 
about a parole board’s review) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 159. LACK OF PAROLE FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS, supra note 142, at 4 
(“Sometimes, prisoners are given psychological exams or other tests by the 
board.”).  
 160. Id. 
 161.  See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151(A) (1993). 
 162. See id. § 53.1-151(A)(1) (“For the first time, shall be eligible for parole 
after serving one-fourth of the term of imprisonment imposed, or after serving 
twelve years of the term of imprisonment imposed if one-fourth of the term of 
imprisonment imposed is more than twelve years . . . .”). 
 163. See id. § 53.1-151(A)(2) (“For the second time, shall be eligible for parole 
after serving one-third of the term of imprisonment imposed, or after serving 
thirteen years of the term of imprisonment imposed if one-third of the term of 
imprisonment imposed is more than thirteen years . . . .”). 
 164. See id. § 53.1-151(A)(3) (“For the third time, shall be eligible for parole 
after serving one-half of the term of imprisonment imposed, or after serving 
fourteen years of the term of imprisonment imposed if one-half of the term of 
imprisonment imposed is more than fourteen years . . . .”); see also id. 
§ 53.1-151(A)(4) (“For the fourth or subsequent time, shall be eligible for parole 
after serving three-fourths of the term of imprisonment imposed, or after serving 
fifteen years of the term of imprisonment imposed if three-fourths of the term of 
imprisonment imposed is more than fifteen years.”); Krawetz v. Murray, 742 F. 
Supp. 304, 306–07 (E.D. Va. 1990) (explaining how the Virginia statute is applied 
to a fourth-time offender). 
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Virginia statute also limits eligibility for parole by preventing 
certain offenders from applying.165  
The United States Department of Justice has also stipulated 
pertinent justifications for parole: 
Parole has a three-fold purpose: (1) . . . a parolee may obtain 
help with problems concerning employment, residence, 
finances, or other personal problems which often trouble a 
person trying to adjust to life upon release from prison; 
(2) parole protects society because it helps former prisoners get 
established in the community and thus prevents many 
situations in which they might commit a new offense; and 
(3) parole prevents needless imprisonment of those who are not 
likely to commit further crime and who meet the criteria for 
parole.166 
In sum, parole is designed to release those who are ready to return 
to society and be productive as well as to cut costs for taxpayers 
who are spending money to incarcerate criminals. 
C. Comparing Geriatric Release and Parole 
One major difference between geriatric release and parole is 
the age requirement.167 Eligibility for geriatric release depends on 
                                                                                                     
 165. See id. § 53.1-151(B) (”Persons sentenced to die shall not be eligible for 
parole. Any person sentenced to life imprisonment who escapes from a 
correctional facility or from any person in charge of his custody shall not be 
eligible for parole.”); see id. § 53.1-151(B1) (“Any person convicted of three 
separate felony offenses of (i) murder, (ii) rape or (iii) robbery by the presenting 
of firearms or other deadly weapon . . . shall not be eligible for parole.”); see also 
id. § 53.1-151(B2) (“Any person convicted of three separate felony offenses of 
manufacturing, selling, giving, distributing or possessing with the intent to 
manufacture, sell, give or distribute a controlled substance . . . shall not be 
eligible for parole.”): id. § 53.1-151(E) (“A person convicted of an offense and 
sentenced to life imprisonment after being paroled from a previous life sentence 
shall not be eligible for parole.”). 
 166. DOJ FAQ, supra note 141. 
 167. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2001) (listing geriatric release 
candidates as prisoners who are age sixty-five or older, having served five years 
of their sentence, or sixty or older, having served ten years of their sentence); see 
also 28 C.F.R. § 2.78 (2003) (listing sixty-five as the minimum age for federal 
geriatric release candidates). But see Maschi et al., supra note 131, at 12–13 
(explaining that age is not a sole, determinative factor for parole); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 53.1-151 (1993) (providing an example of a state parole system that does not 
consider age before eligibility for parole). 
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a minimum age requirement.168 Conversely, parole does not have 
an age requirement.169 This is a considerable difference especially 
for juveniles. For example, if a sixteen-year-old juvenile is 
sentenced to life in prison in Virginia, he may be eligible for parole 
after completing fifteen years of his sentence at age thirty-one.170 
On the other hand, in a system where the same juvenile does not 
have the opportunity for parole but for geriatric release, he 
would—by a liberal standard—be eligible for release at age sixty, 
thereby forcing him to serve at least forty-four years of his life 
sentence.171  
Furthermore, not only must the prisoner be elderly to qualify 
for geriatric release, but in most cases the prisoner must also be in 
bad health.172 In contrast, poor health is not a requirement for 
parole.173 A parole board’s real task is to decide whether the 
prisoner is ready to re-enter society as a productive human 
being.174 As indicated above, parole boards consider other criteria 
for release that commissions overseeing geriatric release do not 
consider. For example, parole boards consider where the prisoner 
                                                                                                     
 168. See id. § 53.1-40.01 (listing geriatric release candidates as prisoners who 
are age sixty-five or older, having served five years of their sentence, or sixty or 
older, having served ten years of their sentence); 28 C.F.R. § 2.78 (2003) (listing 
sixty-five as the minimum age for federal geriatric release candidates). 
 169. See Maschi et al., supra note 131, at 12–13 (explaining that age is not a 
sole, determinative factor for parole); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151 (providing 
an example of a state parole system that does not consider age for eligibility for 
parole). 
 170. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151(C) (“Any person sentenced to life 
imprisonment for the first time shall be eligible for parole after serving fifteen 
years . . . .”). 
 171. See, e.g., id. § 53.1-40.01 (listing geriatric release candidates as prisoners 
who are age sixty-five or older, having served five years of their sentence, or sixty 
or older, having served ten years of their sentence). 
 172. See Maschi et al., supra note 131, at 13 (“The age of the applicant is 
almost always considered a determinant factor only in conjunction with a medical 
or cognitive condition. The elderly incarcerated are not considered a subset of 
incarcerated people that justify release in their own right without concomitant 
ailments.”). 
 173. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151 (1993) (providing an example of a 
state parole system that does not consider health for eligibility for parole). 
 174. See Maschi et al., supra note 131, at 12 (“Many of the states that include 
vague language around what constellation of factors amount to the likelihood of 
early release seem to have fewer transparent processes, leaving the decision to 
the parole board’s discretion on a case-by-case basis.”). 
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will stay, whether the prisoner has a source of income, and 
whether the prisoner is refraining from drug or alcohol use.175 
Virginia’s statistics on parole and geriatric release are useful 
for comparing the systems. 176 In 2016, the Virginia Parole Board 
considered 2,451 prisoners for parole.177 Of these cases, 125 
prisoners were granted parole and 2,326 were denied.178 So about 
five percent of eligible prisoners were granted parole.179 In 2016, 
the Virginia Parole Board reviewed 626 prisoners’ cases for 
geriatric release.180 Of those 626 prisoners, twenty-six were 
granted release.181 Which is a little more than four percent.182 
While the number of cases differ, the probability of release was 
nearly the same in both systems in 2016.183  
In 2015, Virginia paroled fourteen percent of applicants for 
parole and granted only two percent for geriatric release.184 
Nevertheless, 2015 was more of the exception than the rule. For 
example, in 2014 about 6.6 percent of prisoners were granted 
parole and about four percent were released for geriatric 
reasons.185 In 2013, 3.7 percent were granted parole and 3.3 
percent were released for geriatric reasons.186 In total, for the past 
four years, the percentage of people that applied for parole and 
were granted release was about 7.7 percent.187 The total number 
                                                                                                     
 175. See, e.g., DOJ FAQ, supra note 141 (explaining that many subjects are 
considered, including “the details of the offense, prior criminal history, . . . the 
offender’s accomplishments in the correctional facility, details of a release plan, 
and any problems the offender has had to meet in the past and is likely to face 
again in the future.”); see also, e.g., LACK OF PAROLE FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS, 
supra note 142, at 4 (providing a list of questions that a state parole board might 
ask a parole candidate). 
 176. See generally Parole Decisions, VA. PAROLE BOARD, https://vpb.virginia. 
gov/parole-decisions/ (last visited April 17, 2018) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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for geriatric release over the same amount of time was about 3.6 
percent of those whose cases were reviewed.188 Remember, the 
main reason for the large disparity is the 2015 outlier: parole of 
fourteen percent.189 
The age and health requirements are the likely reasons for 
such a drastic difference in case numbers because fewer prisoners 
are over the age sixty-five than there are under age sixty-five.190 In 
fact, it is estimated that only 4,780 prisoners are over age sixty-
five, out of the total 182,834 prisoners as February 2018.191 This 
means only about 2.6 percent of the prison population is over age 
sixty-five and even fewer than that would likely meet the health 
requirements.192 Even lowering the age requirement to sixty would 
only increase the percentage of the population to about 5.5 
percent.193  
In brief, eligibility for parole and geriatric release differ.194 The 
Supreme Court of Virginia stated: “[t]he determination of a 
prisoner’s eligibility for geriatric release is essentially a 
mathematical calculation. The age of the prisoner and the years 
served of the sentence imposed are readily determinable and, thus, 
not subject to speculation.”195 Thus, geriatric release seemingly 
serves to save money for taxpayers.196 Conversely, age and health 
equations are not determinative for parole197 because parole was 
designed to rehabilitate the offender and make them a productive 
law abiding citizen again.198 Finally, in Virginia, the probability of 
                                                                                                     
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See generally FED. BUREAU PRISONS, Inmate Age, https://www.bop. 
gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_age.jsp (last updated Mar. 24, 2018) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2001) (stipulating geriatric release 
regulations), with id. § 53.1-151(A)(1) (stipulating parole eligibility regulations). 
 195. Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 (Va. 2000). 
 196. See DOJ FAQ, supra note 141 (noting that parole, in part, serves to end 
the “needless imprisonment of those who are not likely to commit further crime”). 
 197. See Maschi et al., supra note 131, at 12–13 (indicating that many states 
only use age as a factor in decision-making for geriatric release). 
 198. See DOJ FAQ, supra note 141 (explaining that supervision within the 
parole system is geared toward “reintegrating the offender as a productive 
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release under either geriatric release or parole is about the same, 
but many more prisoners are considered for parole.199  
VI. How Courts Have Handled Geriatric Release as a Meaningful 
Opportunity for Release Thus Far 
This section addresses how courts have handled geriatric 
release as a meaningful opportunity for release. In State v. 
Zuber,200 Ricky Zuber committed two separate gang rapes when he 
was seventeen years old.201 His consecutive sentences totaled 110 
years with fifty-five years of parole ineligibility.202 The court was 
mainly concerned about the lengthy term-of-years sentence.203 
Zuber argued this was unconstitutional under Graham but the 
Superior Court upheld the sentence.204 The court stated that it 
thought geriatric release could meet the standard for meaningful 
opportunity for release under Graham.205  
In State v. Null,206 Denem Anthony Null was “required to serve 
at least 52.5 years of his seventy-five-year aggregate sentence for 
                                                                                                     
member of society”).   
 199. See generally VA. PAROLE BOARD, supra note 176. 
 200. See State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197 (N.J. 2017) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012)) (holding “that sentencing judges should evaluate the 
Miller factors at that time to ‘take into account how children are different, and 
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime 
in prison.’”). 
 201. See id. at 337 (“Defendant Ricky Zuber was born on April 14, 1964. He 
committed two separate gang rapes in November and December of 1981, when he 
was nearly eighteen years old.”). 
 202. See id. (“He is currently serving consecutive sentences for numerous 
offenses arising out of these two criminal episodes. Those sentences total 110 
years in prison with fifty-five years of parole ineligibility.”). 
 203. See id. (“To apply Graham to defendant’s sentences, Graham would have 
to be extended to cover terms-of-year sentences, aggregated from consecutive 
sentences for different crimes, from different criminal episodes, imposed in 
different sentencing proceedings.”). 
 204. See id. (“Even making the assumptions that Graham could be thus 
extended, we reject the defendant’s claim.”). 
 205. See id. (“Defendant’s sentence of fifty-five years before parole eligibility 
is not the functional equivalent of life without parole, because it gives him a 
meaningful and realistic opportunity for parole well within the predicted lifespan 
for a person of defendant’s age.”). 
 206. See State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72 (Iowa 2013) (holding Miller’s 
principles are applicable “to a lengthy term-of-years sentence as was imposed in 
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second-degree murder and first-degree robbery.”207 Null was 
sixteen-years-old when he shot and killed Kevin Bell during a 
robbery at Bell’s apartment.208 The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed 
Null’s conviction, but vacated his sentence and remanded the case 
for resentencing.209 The court decided this lengthy sentence 
required Miller type protections.210 It reasoned that geriatric 
release does not escape the rationales of Graham because it 
requires the juvenile to have served nearly half a century in prison 
before they would be in their sixties.211 Furthermore, the court 
stated there is no certainty the juvenile would ever be considered 
for geriatric release and therefore is not a meaningful opportunity 
for release.212 
In the next case, Bear Cloud v. State,213 a sixteen-year-old 
Wyatt Bear Cloud was convicted of first-degree murder, 
aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated 
burglary.214 Mr. Bear Cloud “stole a gun” and “later broke into a 
                                                                                                     
this case because an offender sentenced to a lengthy term-of-years sentence 
should not be worse off than an offender sentenced to life in prison without parole 
who has the benefit of an individualized hearing under Miller.”). 
 207. Id. at 45. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. (“[W]e affirm Null’s conviction, but vacate his sentence and 
remand the case to the district court for resentencing consistent with this 
opinion.”). 
 210. See id. at 71 (concluding that a “52.5-year minimum prison term for a 
juvenile based on the aggregation of mandatory minimum sentences for second-
degree murder and first-degree robbery triggers the protections to be afforded 
under Miller—namely, an individualized sentencing hearing to determine the 
issue of parole eligibility”). 
 211. See id. (“Even if lesser sentence than life without parole might be less 
problematic, we do not regard the juvenile’s potential future release in his or her 
late sixties after a half a century of incarceration sufficient to escape the 
rationales of Graham or Miller.”).  
 212. See id. (“The prospect of geriatric release, if one is to be afforded the 
opportunity for release at all, does not provide a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to 
demonstrate the ‘maturity and rehabilitation’ required to obtain release and 
reenter a society as required by Graham.”). 
 213. See Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 141–42 (Wyo. 2014) (holding “that 
the teachings of the Roper/Graham/Miller trilogy require sentencing courts to 
provide an individualized sentencing hearing to weigh the factors for determining 
a juvenile’s ‘diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform’ when, as 
here, the aggregate sentences result in the functional equivalent of life without 
parole.”). 
 214. See id. at 135 (listing the criminal convictions of the defendant, Bear 
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home along with two other young men.”215 During the burglary, 
one of the two other men, Mr. Sen, “shot and killed one of the 
home’s residents with the stolen gun.”216 Mr. Bear Cloud was 
sentenced to “20–25 years in prison for Aggravated Burglary; life 
in prison ‘according to law’ for first-degree murder, to be served 
consecutively to the aggravated burglary sentence; and 20–25 
years in prison for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, to 
be served concurrently with the first-degree murder sentence.”217 
The main issue of his appeal was whether the sentence of life in 
prison without parole, based on the aggregate term of years, 
violates the Eight Amendment.218 The Wyoming Supreme Court 
agreed with the Iowa Supreme Court’s reasoning in Null, which 
found that geriatric release was not a meaningful opportunity for 
release under Graham.219 Thus, the Wyoming Supreme Court 
remanded the case for resentencing in accordance with Graham 
and Miller.220 
The final set of cases comes from Virginia, where the most 
recent decisions have been made. One of the first cases that 
addressed this issue in the Commonwealth was Angel v. 
Commonwealth,221 in which Rubio Argelio Angel—a seventeen-
year-old—was arrested for malicious wounding, abduction with 
intent to defile, two counts of object sexual penetration, and 
misdemeanor sexual battery.222 Angel “was sentenced to three 
                                                                                                     
Cloud). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See id. at 135 (quoting Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36, 40 (Wyo. 2013)) 
(“On remand, even though the United States Supreme Court had vacated the 
judgment without restriction, this Court held that ‘[o]nly the life sentence for 
first-degree murder is at issue in this appeal.’”). 
 219. See id. at 142 (“We find the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme Court [in 
Null] to be persuasive.”). 
 220. See id. at 147 (“We reverse and remand to the district court for 
resentencing in accordance with this opinion.”). 
 221. Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 402 (Va. 2011) (holding that 
“that the imposition of life sentences without parole in this case is not cruel and 
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution pursuant to Graham”). 
 222. Id. at 389. 
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consecutive life terms and a twenty-year term of imprisonment, 
plus twelve months in jail.”223  
One of the issues in Angel was whether this life sentence, 
without an opportunity for parole, was valid under Graham.224 The 
Supreme Court of Virginia reasoned that Angel’s sentence did not 
violate Graham because there was an opportunity for release via 
Virginia’s geriatric release program.225 The Court stated, “[w]hile 
this statute has an age qualifier, it provides, as the Commonwealth 
argues, the ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ required by the Eighth 
Amendment.”226 
In Vasquez v. Commonwealth,227 sixteen-year-old Darien 
Vasquez and Brandon Valentin broke into a townhouse, raped a 
college student and “threatened to kill her if she resisted.”228 
Vasquez was convicted of eighteen felonies and Valentin of 
twelve.229 The defendants argued that their “aggregate term-of-
years sentences imposed by the court violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.”230 
The Supreme Court of Virginia decided that the Graham rule “does 
not apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences involving multiple 
crimes.”231 In the concurring opinion, Justice Mims, with whom 
Justice Goodwyn joined, stated that Graham should have applied 
to aggregate term of years sentences but that Virginia’s geriatric 
                                                                                                     
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. at 401 (explaining that Angel’s petition for appeal and brief on 
the merits before [the Virginia Supreme Court] “contained an assignment of error 
claiming that [his] sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution”). 
 225. See id. (“The Commonwealth replies that Graham does not require the 
result advanced by Angel because Code § 53.1-40.01 provides for the conditional 
release of prisoners who have reached a certain age and served a certain length 
of imprisonment, thus complying with the Supreme Court’s decision. We agree 
with the Commonwealth.”). 
 226. Id. at 402. 
 227. See Vazquez v. Commonwealth, 781 S.E.2d 920, 928 (Va. 2016) (holding 
that “Graham does not apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences 
involving multiple crimes”). 
 228. Id. at 922. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 928. 
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release statute would nevertheless make these sentences 
constitutional even without the opportunity for parole.232 
The next and most recent case from Virginia is LeBlanc v. 
Mathena.233 In this case, LeBlanc was found “guilty of rape and 
abduction.”234 He committed the offenses “when he was sixteen 
years old.”235 He was sentenced to two life imprisonment terms.236 
Furthermore, he was ineligible for parole pursuant to Va. Code 
Ann. § 53.1-165.1.237 The issue here was whether geriatric release 
could meet the meaningful opportunity that Graham requires.238 
The Virginia Supreme Court said the geriatric release statute does 
satisfy Graham so the decision was appealed to the United States 
District Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.239  
The Fourth Circuit stated, “Virginia courts unreasonably 
ignored the plain language of the procedures governing review of 
petitions for geriatric release, which authorize the State Parole 
Board to deny geriatric release for any reason, without considering 
a juvenile offender’s maturity and rehabilitation.”240 Accordingly, 
the court decided that the presence of the geriatric release statute 
                                                                                                     
 232. See id. at 935 (Mims, J., concurring) (explaining that “Virginia’s geriatric 
release statute, if applied as written, is capable of providing juveniles with such 
sentences a meaningful opportunity for release as mandated by Graham . . .”). 
 233. See LeBlanc v. Mathena, 841 F.3d 256, 273 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
“the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably applied Graham when 
it acknowledged Graham’s minimum requirements for parole or early release 
programs for juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment but 
concluded that Geriatric Release . . . complied with those requirements”). 
 234. Id. at 260. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. (“Petitioner was ineligible for parole pursuant to Va. Code Ann 
§ 53.1-165.1, which abolished parole for individuals convicted of a felony 
committed after January 1, 1995.”). 
 238. See id. (“In 2011, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his sentence in state 
trial court. The motion argued that Graham rendered Petitioner’s life sentence 
invalid. In opposition, Respondents asserted that, notwithstanding Virginia’s 
abolition of parole, Petitioner’s life sentence did not violate Graham . . . .”).  
 239. See id. at 259–60 (“[W]e nonetheless conclude that Petitioner’s state 
court adjudication constituted an unreasonable application of Graham. Most 
significantly, Virginia courts unreasonably ignored the plain language of the 
procedures governing review of petitions for geriatric release . . . .”). 
 240. Id. 
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did not meet the Graham requirements for meaningful opportunity 
and, therefore, LeBlanc’s sentence was unconstitutional.241  
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that parole and geriatric release 
were not enough alike for geriatric release to hold up under 
Graham.242 Some of the differences the court indicated were the 
age limitation for geriatric release, the prisoner must make the 
claim for geriatric release—whereas parole is an automatic annual 
review—geriatric release may be denied before considering any 
“decision factors,” the geriatric release board does not need to 
interview the prisoner, and geriatric release requires approval by 
four of the five members whereas parole only requires three.243 
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision and reversed.244 The Court made it clear 
that its decision was not based on whether Geriatric release is 
reasonable under Graham, but rather on whether the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision was objectively reasonable “in light of this 
Court’s current case law.”245 Indeed, the Court recognized the 
arguments for and against geriatric release as a meaningful 
opportunity for release under Graham.246 The Court then 
reasoned, “[t]hese arguments cannot be resolved on federal habeas 
review. . . . Nor does the Court ‘suggest or imply that the 
underlying issue, if presented on direct review, would be 
insubstantial. The Court today holds only that the Virginia trial 
court’s ruling. . . was not objectively unreasonable. . . .”247 
Consequently, the issue has been left unresolved. 
                                                                                                     
 241. See id. (internal citations omitted) (“[I]t was objectively unreasonable for 
the state courts to conclude that geriatric release affords Petitioner with the 
‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation’ Graham demands. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to relief from 
his unconstitutional sentence.”). 
 242. See id. at 268 (explaining that “[f]or several reasons, we agree with 
Petitioner that his state court adjudication constituted an ‘unreasonable 
application’ of Graham”). 
 243. See id. at 262–63 (detailing differences between parole and geriatric 
release). 
 244. See Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S. Ct. 1726, 1730 (2017) (“For these 
reasons . . . the judgement of the Court of Appeals is reversed.”). 
 245. Id. at 1729. 
 246. See id. (explaining that the standard that no “fairminded people” could 
disagree on this issue, was not met). 
 247. Id. 
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VII. Conclusion 
In brief, the Graham rule intended to eliminate the possibility 
of LWOP sentences for juveniles in non-homicide cases.248 The 
intent behind this rule was largely based on the fact that juveniles 
are less culpable than adults and lack maturity.249 This youthful 
factor is important in sentencing because it is possible the juvenile 
will mature, learn from their mistakes, and become fully 
rehabilitated.250 A LWOP sentence does not consider this factor 
because the juvenile may never be released from prison regardless 
of their rehabilitation. This is why the Supreme Court requires a 
meaningful opportunity for release in these cases.251 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court left it to the states to decide 
what would constitute a “meaningful opportunity for release.”252 
Many states have had issues with defining “meaningful 
opportunity for release” and have come up with various ways to 
effectively sentence a juvenile to LWOP without literally doing 
so.253 For example, some states have contemplated geriatric 
release as a “meaningful opportunity.”254 Numerous courts have 
refused to accept that geriatric release satisfies Graham.255  
Some reasons for this may be because geriatric release differs 
from parole markedly in that it has age and health 
requirements.256 So, if a juvenile’s only opportunity for release is 
geriatric parole, they will not be eligible for release until they are 
                                                                                                     
 248. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (describing the 
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 249. Id.at 68. 
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at least sixty-years-old and even then, they need to meet the other 
requirements.257 Accordingly, like life without parole sentences, 
geriatric release does not take the youth factor into account. 
Therefore, geriatric release should not satisfy the meaningful 
opportunity for release that Graham requires.  
                                                                                                     
 257. Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-40.01. 
